Is the Lebanon File the Key to Ending the Iran War?
Iran’s increased support for and reliance on Hezbollah suggests a fresh pivot for nuclear concessions.
One of the important conclusions to draw from the Iran War is how much importance Tehran attaches to Hezbollah, its long-time Lebanese Shiite ally. This is not to be dismissed as business as usual, but rather reflects a major shift whereby supporting Hezbollah has become even more necessary for Iran’s national security.
Lebanon emerged as a major sticking point during the Islamabad talks to end the war. After apparently agreeing to an Iranian demand for a Lebanese–Israeli ceasefire as part of a potential broader deal, the Trump administration appeared to renege on this demand at the behest of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Shortly after the start of the ceasefire, Israel conducted an intense bombing spree in Lebanon in what became known as Black Wednesday, resulting in the death of over 350 civilians. In response Tehran reasserted control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Against the backdrop of this Iranian intransigence on Lebanon, Trump announced a 10-day ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. This episode demonstrated how Iran remained firmly committed to its alliance with Hezbollah, which joined the Iran war in support of its patron in early March by launching a missile attack against Israel.
Recent statements by senior Iranian officials further revealed the importance Tehran attaches to its alliance with Hezbollah.
While Iran said that its more recent seizure of the Strait of Hormuz was in response to the American naval blockade on Iranian ports, there are indications that the situation in Lebanon also weighed heavily on Tehran’s decision.
In remarks to Iranian television on April 18, Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf—who led Tehran’s delegation to Islamabad—said that his country retook the Strait in response to Israeli violations of the ceasefire with Lebanon.
“We have always sought normalization of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and we still do,” said Qalibaf. “If it was stopped now, it was because the ceasefire had not been fully established in Lebanon.”
It is fair to say that Iran appears to be doubling down on its support for Hezbollah. The alliance has become a national security imperative for the Islamic Republic.
This owes to the shifts in Tehran’s threat environment, which today is its most challenging since the eight-year war with Iraq.
There are two dynamics that support this argument: Israel’s aggressiveness and regional ambitions in the response to the October 7 attacks, and Bashar Al-Assad’s ouster from power in Syria.
After October 7, Israel went on a regional offensive that saw it target the Iranian homeland. This included the assassination of the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the 12-Day War. Most recently, the Israelis successfully lobbied the Trump administration into conducting a joint military operation aimed at regime change in Iran in late February.
While Israel failed to achieve its war objectives in Iran, what happened illustrated how it went from being a geopolitical foe for Tehran to also becoming a threat to its national security.
One could argue that it is because of Iranian support for Hezbollah and the wider Axis of Resistance that Iran came under direct Israeli attack. By this line of argument, the Islamic Republic would cease to face such a threat should it end its support for Hezbollah and the other Axis of Resistance members.
This, however, ignores Israeli aspirations to Middle Eastern regional hegemony. In line with these aspirations, Israel has sought to demonize Turkey following the rise of Ankara’s role in post-Assad Syria, with Israeli politicians accusing Turkey of leading a “radical Sunni axis” that rivals Iran’s “Shiite axis.” This demonstrated that Israel’s hegemonic ambitions place regional counterweight nations in its crosshairs, regardless of their support for the Axis of Resistance.
Syria meanwhile has gone from being a close ally to a national security threat for Tehran, after the toppling of the former president Bashar al-Assad and the rise to power of Ahmad al-Sharaa, once the leader of an Al Qaeda-linked militia.
This has been evident in official Iranian threat assessments, with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence issuing an unusual warning in August last year that Syria-based Salafi jihadis were preparing to travel to Iran and carry out attacks in the country.
While these warnings failed to materialize, the Salafi jihadi threat emanating from Syria has only grown more acute. There has been a gradual ISIS comeback in post-Assad Syria, with the terrorist group recently declaring that it would intensify its campaign against al-Sharaa and his government. American intelligence agencies have also reportedly warned that more ISIS members are at large in Syria after a mass exodus of individuals that were being held at the al-Hol camp in the northeast of the country.
It is worth recalling that ISIS is responsible for the worst ever terrorist attack in Iran, when a twin bombing claimed the lives of at least 95 people in the province of Kerman during the annual commemoration of the death of the former IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani.
Hezbollah is uniquely positioned to serve as a bulwark against these twin dangers, given its geopolitical proximity to Israel and Syria and its relatively successful record against both the Israeli military and Salafi jihadi groups in Syria.
The group managed to fight Israel to a standstill in 2006 in a war that was deemed a major failure by an Israeli inquiry commission. Notwithstanding the heavy losses inflicted by Israel against Hezbollah since that time, including the assassination of its former leader Hassan Nasrallah and the famous pager detonation operation that took out a large number of its fighters, the group has nevertheless put up a strong fight against Israel in the latest round of confrontations.
Similarly, in Syria Hezbollah proved to be instrumental against Salafi jihadis and in turning the tide in favor of the former Assad government against these forces. It was only after Hezbollah’s heavy losses in late 2024 that the anti-Assad forces were able to oust Assad.
This points to a fundamental transformation in the Iran-Hezbollah alliance from one serving a purpose of expanding Iranian influence in the Arab Shiite world to one which is rooted in Tehran’s national security considerations. That effectively makes the alliance with Hezbollah more vital for the Islamic Republic.
This dynamic actually creates an opportunity for Trump in future talks with Iran. Given how vital Hezbollah has become for Tehran, the Islamic Republic may be willing to cede some ground in its nuclear program in exchange for Washington deprioritizing the dismantling of Hezbollah. Based on Trump’s public proclamations, this might just be a workable arrangement, as he has consistently maintained that his first priority with Iran is that it cannot have nuclear weapons, with support for “proxies” coming further down the list.
This would, however, face fierce opposition from Israel and its allies in Washington, and there are also signs that Trump remains closely wedded to the Israeli agenda in Lebanon. Washington is presiding over the first ever direct Lebanese–Israeli talks since 1993. During the first round of these talks, which brought together the Lebanese and Israeli ambassadors in Washington, Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the process as part of a broader effort aimed at “bringing a permanent end to 20 or 30 years of Hezbollah’s influence in this part of the world.” The president himself has reiterated that the U.S. continues to demand that Iran stop its backing of proxy groups in the Mideast, including Hezbollah, as part of any deal between Washington and Tehran to end the U.S. war on Iran.
”Yeah, they’ll have to cut that,” Trump said to a reporter’s question Thursday about aiding the militant group. “That’s a must.”
This strongly suggests that Washington is placating Netanyahu by remaining committed to the dismantling of Hezbollah. Given the growing importance Iran attaches to its Lebanese ally, this would seriously undermine the chances of a broader deal in which Tehran may be willing to make tangible concessions on its nuclear program.
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