No 4D Chess: War With Iran Helps China
Wannabe analysts depict the quagmire as a masterstroke.
We’ve heard it all before.
Pro-war MAGA commentators insist that every move President Donald Trump makes is a strategic masterstroke. The war with Iran is no exception. What appears to be a Middle Eastern quagmire in the making is not a blunder at all. Instead, this war is “really” about China. Another oil shock is nothing to worry about. It is “really” leverage against America’s “main rival”. Another open-ended entanglement is not overextension. It is “really” the opening act of a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy that the “America Lasters” are too daft to understand.
This is the 4D chess defense of the Iran war. It is also nonsense, cooked up by propagandists and consumed by those eager to believe Trump hasn’t betrayed his base.
Perhaps the clearest version of this case came, fittingly, from The Free Press, where Zineb Riboua of the Hudson Institute argued that striking Iran is “all about China.” Since Tehran is a pillar of Beijing’s Middle Eastern strategy, the theory goes, breaking Iran would weaken China and give America a competitive edge in Asia. Another version of this story suggests that the Chinese economy will be among the greatest casualties of the war because of its dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf.
Both of these narratives collapse under scrutiny. They assume that the war remains limited and ends quickly, and that the shock falls harder on Beijing than on America and its Asian partners. Now, after more than a month of war, as key U.S. missile defenses continue to dwindle and as Asian markets flounder with no clear end in sight, that fantasy has proved an illusion.
Starting with the supposedly obvious economic argument, this war does not clearly hurt China directly. While China is to some extent dependent on Gulf oil, so is the rest of Asia. While the United States might be insulated from some of the worst consequences of the Hormuz closure, the economies of our Asian allies are not. Asian economies are among the most dependent on Middle Eastern oil, with South Korea receiving around 70 percent and Japan receiving a whopping 95 percent of their oil from the Middle East. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that in 2024, 84 percent of the oil and 83 percent of LNG shipped through Hormuz were bound for Asia. That is not a targeted squeeze. Instead, such a move looks to be made without much heed to Asia at all, hitting the very states Washington is supposedly positioning against Beijing.
China is actually one of the best-positioned countries in Asia to handle this exact crisis because of existing stockpiles, diversified supply chains, a coal-dependent electric grid, and pipeline alternatives. While China is vulnerable, it is more insulated than most of Asia, only receiving around 20 percent of its oil from Hormuz.
Moreover, China is still getting some oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Even amid this current crisis, dozens of ships continue to pass through the strait with the permission of the Iranian government. Whose vessels do the Iranians permit? Tankers carrying oil to China have been allowed to pass through the strait because of the strong relationship between Beijing and Iran. This gives the Chinese an obvious advantage over their neighboring economies that are already more exposed to shocks. Why would Beijing hate this? If anything, Iran is clearly strangling America’s major non-NATO allies while China maintains preferential access, implying that the war with Iran is a strategic victory for Beijing, not Washington.
This damage to our Pacific allies is not theoretical. Across Asia, partner governments are already scrambling as their economies face the worst crisis in decades. Asian nations are shortening workweeks and implementing fuel controls, disrupting their economies as tension mounts. Many Asian economies have turned to Russia amid this turmoil, bolstering the economy of another supposed U.S. enemy. So much for strategic brilliance. The American strategy with Iran has simultaneously weakened our allies while bolstering Russia’s economy and improving China’s strategic position. Needless to say, Putin and Xi see this as a win.
If this war were really about strengthening America’s position in Asia, one would expect that places like Taiwan would feel emboldened by U.S. policies and advocate for increased deterrence stemming from a strengthened position. Instead, opposition to American dependency is brewing. Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-wun, head of the Kuomintang, has decided to meet with Xi Jinping, marking a historic meeting scheduled, likely intentionally, before Trump is scheduled to arrive in Beijing. When asked why Cheng would break protocol to meet with Xi, she said, “the world does not need a crisis over Taiwan” amid current hostilities.
At the same time, Taiwan is one of the nations heavily reliant on Gulf oil. Closing the strait has weakened Taiwan, and Beijing posits that a closer relationship with the mainland would offer the island nation “energy security.” Not only is this war draining resources, but, as is often the case in Chinese diplomacy, it allows Beijing to present itself as a force for order in a world that increasingly sees Washington as the chaotic actor.
This same pattern is already visible in South Korea as well. After Seoul damaged relations with China by receiving THAAD interceptors from America, Washington demonstrated that its pivot to Asia was conditional, moving components of said interceptor systems out shortly after another war started in the Middle East. Even if such a move is temporary, Asian allies cannot ignore this lesson. They are constantly told China is the defining threat of the century, yet when push comes to shove, America’s political focus and resources remain tied to the Middle East. Rather than strengthening resolve, the U.S. has implicitly told Asian allies that they will be deprioritized during a crisis.
Riboua’s argument can be dismissed with this case alone. As seen in South Korea, the war is consuming the exact systems needed in a serious conflict with China. Reports now estimate that close to a third of America’s THAAD stockpile has already been depleted, and rebuilding that capacity will take years. This is also true of the Patriot interceptors, which have been expended rapidly. Ignoring this fact is not trivial. Wars are often won by logistics and strategy, not tactics, and logistically, these weapons are what would matter in a missile war in Asia. While the hawks say burning through missiles in the Gulf is preparatory for a conflict with Beijing, America resembles Ouroboros eating its own tail.
Additionally, it is hard to take concepts of a grand plan seriously when the president clearly doesn’t have one. The administration still cannot define what victory means. Add to that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s purge of senior military leadership in the middle of an escalating conflict and you have a recipe for disaster. This would already be a reckless gamble under competent leadership. Entrusting it to Hegseth, a former Fox News host, is like putting a drunk in the driver’s seat.
Trump himself is the best evidence against this China fantasy. One moment, he says “core strategic objectives are nearing completion,” yet in the same breath, he says the United States will continue to strike Iran “extremely hard over the next two to three weeks.” While “regime change was not our goal,” apparently, regime change occurred because the previous leadership is dead. Just a week ago, reopening the strait was a primary war goal. Then, Trump shifted to saying America doesn’t need Hormuz oil, and those that do should “go to the strait and just take it” themselves, never mind that he started this mess. Now, he’s again demanding Tehran open the strait or face civilizational extinction. This is the messaging of a government with no end goal. Trump is winging it and hoping he can land on a message that will uphold ambiguity before market calamity strikes.
The 4D chess narrative is a post hoc rationalization for another impulsive war in the Middle East and the failings of the president. There is no hidden genius in hammering our Asian allies and draining needed defenses in the Pacific. Taiwan and South Korea are both alarmed because this is clearly not part of a disciplined anti-China policy, and they have to adjust to that reality. Beijing need not respond with some brilliant countermove, either. As long as Washington behaves recklessly, Xi gets what he wants. America wastes its strength in the Gulf, and China’s neighbors, reluctant to partner with Beijing, are increasingly wondering if doing so is a foregone conclusion, if not a preferable outcome.
Those still faithful to the president will eventually be forced to realize that there is no plan, only another self-inflicted defeat on the road to multipolarity.
The post No 4D Chess: War With Iran Helps China appeared first on The American Conservative.
