A spiral of escalation of the war in Ukraine is making a catastrophic widening of the conflict increasingly possible.
The recent incident of Russian drones breaching Polish airspace has reignited a fraught and dangerous discussion: Is Poland on a path to direct conflict with Russia?
This is not a new fear. Western headlines consistently warn of a Russian attack on Poland, an idea that Moscow dismisses out of hand. Simultaneously, Russian officials accuse Warsaw of plotting to send troops into western Ukraine, a charge Poland categorically rejects, insisting it has no intention to intervene even after the war.
Upon examination, both of these narratives are logically flimsy. Russia, with its military heavily committed in Ukraine, gains nothing from opening a second front—with a NATO member at that.
For Poland, entering a war would be an act of economic and social self-destruction. It is currently one of the EU’s fastest-growing economies, a dynamic, business-friendly success story. Sacrificing this bright future for a war that Warsaw does not want—and for a Ukrainian neighbor with whom relations are historically complex—makes no strategic sense. As former president Andrzej Duda noted, Kiev has sought to draw Poland into the conflict from the beginning, but Warsaw has consistently refused.
This reluctance is rooted in a deep-seated suspicion of being manipulated into the conflict. Duda pointed to the November 2022 missile incident as a prime example. After a missile struck Polish territory, killing two civilians, many assumed that Russia had taken the war beyond Ukraine’s borders; today, the leading theory is that a Ukrainian air defense missile misfired and landed in Poland. Duda confirmed that Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky immediately blamed Russia and insisted Warsaw do the same, an accusation that, if acted upon, could have resulted in an invocation of NATO’s Article 5. After a journalist suggested Zelensky’s goal was to entangle Warsaw in the war, Duda answered, rather diplomatically, “One could say that.” Duda went onto explain that “this is in their [Ukraine’s] interests… The dream of the leaders in Ukraine’s position is for NATO to stand shoulder to shoulder with them… We, Poland, a NATO country, could not agree to that.”
This testimony from a key NATO leader underscores that Warsaw’s refusal to be drawn into the fight is a conscious, strategic choice, not mere hesitancy. It is a stance born of the understanding that its own national interests are distinct from Kiev’s maximalist goals.
Yet, the drumbeat for war grows louder. Why?
The logic for the West’s “War Party”—which comprises most European leaders and a considerable part of the U.S. establishment—is grim: Ukraine is losing a war of attrition. To shift the balance, another nation must significantly escalate its involvement or even join directly in fighting against Russia. Poland, with its large army, patriotic society, and shared border, is the obvious candidate.
However, two monumental obstacles stand in the way. First, while the Poles are ready to defend their homeland, they have no appetite for dying for Ukraine. Second, the United States opposes any NATO member entering the conflict, fearing it would precipitously increase the risk of nuclear war. This was Biden’s position, and it has only hardened under Trump.
The Polish government, for its part, isn’t looking for a pretext to wage war against Russia. Therefore, Poland’s entry into the war is only plausible under one condition: a blatant, undeniable attack by Russia itself. Not stray drones or murky sabotage, but a clear act of aggression.
This cautious, almost legalistic approach was on full display in Warsaw’s response to the latest drone incursions. When asked if Poland would be willing to preemptively shoot down drones over Ukrainian territory if they approached the border, President Karol Nawrocki—a conservative sovereigntist who, like Duda, is deeply wary of being drawn into conflicts that don’t serve Poland’s national interest—was unequivocal. He stated that the Polish army shoots down drones “as soon as they cross the border of Poland.”
This official stance underscores Warsaw’s razor-sharp focus on territorial defense and its refusal to be goaded into actions that could be construed as an act of war against Russia.
Still, why did Russia fly drones over Polish territory in the first place? Here is where the logic of the Western War Party collides with dangerous new realities. While provoking Poland seems insane for Moscow—threatening the Kaliningrad exclave and risking NATO’s Article 5—geopolitical discourse within Russia is shifting. Its own War Party of nationalist hardliners is buzzing with talk of raising the stakes to bring the war home to Europeans, hoping to shatter their support for Ukraine.
This would be a catastrophic miscalculation. If the reaction to Ukraine’s invasion is any indicator, attacks on Poland—unlike Ukraine, a member of both NATO and EU—would likely unite Europeans in defense of Poland. It would validate the very argument Western hawks have used to increase military spending: that Russia is an existential threat to Europe. Far from ending support for Ukraine, aggression against Poland would galvanize it by seeming to vindicate those who claim that Russia’s war aims extend far beyond Ukraine.
We are now in a classic security dilemma, where actions taken by one side for its own defense are perceived as threats by the other, leading to a spiral of reciprocal countermeasures. Poland, to show resolve, could fly drones over Kaliningrad. Russia in response could station short-range missiles closer to its mainland borders, within striking distance of Poland. That could be met with a threat to block Baltic shipping into Russian ports. Each step brings us closer to the brink.
The only guaranteed way to stop this escalatory spiral is to stop the war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, whenever Trump succeeds in opening a constructive dialogue with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, he also meets resistance from Zelensky and European leaders.
In a recent interview, Zelensky pointedly criticized last month’s Trump–Putin summit in Alaska, demanded the U.S. take a harder line on Russia (contrary to Trump’s demand that Europe move first by completely phasing out the Russian oil), and called for “clear” security guarantees that Kiev has not yet received.
This points to a significant rift. Reports suggest that in Alaska, Putin offered Trump a compromise, albeit not one that Russia hawks would recognize as such: a ceasefire in exchange for Ukrainian withdrawal from the entire Donbas. Trump, seeking a deal, was reportedly amenable. Zelensky and Europe rejected it.
Now, Putin waits for Trump to pressure Kiev into accepting these terms, while Zelensky’s goal is to resist that pressure and pull Trump back to a hardline position against Moscow.
Trump, however, appears to be unwavering in his commitment to end the war. When recently pressed by a Ukrainian journalist on military aid, Trump said: “the country is in a difficult situation. This should never have happened. This is a war that should never have happened. The country is in a very difficult situation, but I am going to stop it.” He framed it as a personal feud between Zelensky and Putin that he is determined to resolve.
The renewed talk of Polish entry into the war must be seen in this light. For those opposed to a negotiated settlement based on the Alaska parameters (the only realistic framework, given the situation on the ground), escalation is a tool. A wider war would shatter any possibility of a continued, constructive Trump–Putin dialogue and lock the U.S. into a confrontational stance.
The path to peace is being sabotaged from both sides. In Moscow, by hawks pushing for a dangerous “Caribbean Crisis 2.0.” In the West, by those who believe only total victory is acceptable, regardless of the existential risks. Caught in the middle, Poland becomes the potential trigger for a catastrophe nobody wants, but which all sides are making increasingly possible.
The post Poland and the Perils of Russia–Ukraine Escalation appeared first on The American Conservative.
